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The Berlin Crisis of
1961 and the 2nd Squadron of the 14th Armored Cavalry
BG ( ret ) Albin F. Irzyk, 14th Armored Regimental Commander in 1961
and retired Colonels Ray Teel and Kurt Rosler recall the Berlin
crisis of August 1961 and the actions of the 2nd Squadron in the
border area.
No Ordinary Summer
 The
Summer of 1961 was fraught with international tension as Russian and
American interests clashed over Berlin. The conflict had been
brewing since 1958 and at the heart of it was the Soviet demand that
US, French and British forces leave Berlin. This would allow the
divided city to be fully absorbed into the East German Republic and
this was something that the Americans, West Germans and the NATO
partners would not stand for.
By agreement even before World War II had ended, the former German
capital had been divided into four zones of occupation with each of
the major allies claiming a portion of the city. By 1960, the
French and British had mostly withdrawn their token military forces
and turned their sections over to the American administration which
maintained a ready force of diplomats, spies and a military
presence, the Berlin Brigade, in the city that floated like an
island 140 miles inside of East Germany. West Berlin had a fully
functional German civil and political administration that reported
to the Federal German Republic in Bonn.
The Russian sector of the city, East Berlin, was the capital of
Communist East Germany and maintained its own city administration.
Although the border lines elsewhere in Germany were now marked with
a barrier system and guard towers as was the exterior of the western
perimeter of the city, the city itself was surprisingly open. Lines
were painted on the streets where the east and west sections met,
there was some barbed wire and there were a lot of police check -
points but that was about the limit of the division. The two
Berlins, the Russians and Americans and the Germans, both East and
West argued frequently, reconciled rarely and grumpily coexisted.
Each party had a unique perspective on the city.
The Russians saw the divided city as a mid grade irritant, something
left over from the war years and something they would rather do
without. There were problems with West Berlin, it served as a focal
point for East Germans looking to flee to the West, it was an
espionage hub in the middle of Communist East Germany; it was an
inconvenient symbol of an early defeat in the Cold War. By treaty,
the Americans and West Germans were granted rail, Autobahn and air
access rights to the city and when the Soviets had early on closed
the ground routes in 1949 in an attempt to force the Allies out, the
Americans kept the city supplied by air with the Berlin Airlift
until the diplomats met and the Russians begrudgingly reopened the
ground routes.
The East Germans likewise viewed West Berlin as a problem, it was
the funnel point for thousands of fleeing East Germans who otherwise
were penned in the country by the ever efficient border barrier
system. East Germany correctly feared that the youth and vigor of
the nation would drain away through West Berlin. Significant
barriers had not been established on city streets because under
agreement, the city was supposed to be viewed and administrated as a
complete entity and governed through a spirit of cooperation between
East and West and that included reasonable passage between the
zones. The East Germans also took great exception to the never
ending string of West German politicians who would flock to Berlin
and use the city as a backdrop as they lectured the East over the
evils of the Communist political system.
For West Germany, the divided Berlin was a major symbol of their
resolve to reunite the country, sooner or later and have the capital
once again in Berlin. It was an expensive dream, however. The
western zone of the city could hardly generate the jobs to support
even a fraction of the population let alone provide for the costs of
rebuilding after World War II. West German companies were reticent
to invest in West Berlin due to the fear that all could be lost if
the Russians simply gambled to take the entire city. Through
enormous subsidies, tax breaks and down right arm twisting to
encourage investment, West Germany kept their part of the city alive
and then thriving as a show place. They had a saying, “ West Berlin
is the Christmas tree ornament too precious too hide and too
expensive to ever let fall. “
And in the United States, keeping West Berlin sovereign and free,
maintaining the strict letter of the law according to the earlier
signed treaties and never backing down in the face of Soviet
provocations were major symbols of national resolve. On the global
stage where even small events could be magnified to outrageous
proportions, Berlin was an important symbol and a significant poker
chip with one question always lingering; was Berlin a city, a
problem, an idea or an ideal worthy of what level of gamble and was
it ultimately worth the risk of war?
1961 - A Most
Dangerous Year
On June 4, 1961 Russian Premier Nikita Khrushchev and President
Kennedy met in Vienna to discuss the pressing international issues
of the day and foremost was Berlin. The Russians argued that it was
time to move past the old war time agreements that had led to the
two Germanys and a divided Berlin. They proposed a separate peace
treaty with East Berlin and this would end their formal oversight of
the eastern half of the city. The Americans would likewise end
their official relationship with West Berlin and would withdraw. The
issues of the divided city would be strictly German affairs and the
logical solution was reuniting the city under the East German
banner. Kennedy would have none of this but offered no counter
solutions beyond the current status quo. Political cartoons of the
time featured Berlin with a burning fuse, with Kennedy and
Khrushchev oblivious as they postured and strutted.
Back in the United States as a response, from 1960 onward, the
military had been steadily identifying and then activating select
National Guard units. This was a time consuming process, air force
units took somewhat less time to bring up to combat standards, Army
units, particularly divisions where units were spread across several
states, took more time. Ultimately, over 600 national guard units
were called to service during this period effecting almost 50, 000
personnel and they all were earmarked for duty in Germany. Whatever
happened in Berlin and whether there might be a diplomatic solution,
there would always be a military alternative
On 13 August, the crisis came to a head. The East German leader,
Walter Ulbrecht, followed through with the plan to wall off the
western half of the city and over 20, 000 police and para military
police converged to maintain order and guard the work crews. In
days, road and rail links were cut between the two halves of the
city and the walls went up. In days, the first shooting occurred on
the border of the divided city as a civilian tried to cross to the
west.
In Washington and the Pentagon, this was not unexpected and one plan
visualized American tanks in Berlin pushing down the walls at key
points of the city in the belief that the East Germans would have
stopped further construction. This was not done, however, and the
crisis in Berlin began to unfold in slow motion. The US military
did, however, quickly ramp up training and deployment of National
Guard units to Germany and in public display of force and American
commitment, it was announced that the First Battle Group of the
8th Infantry, led by Colonel Glover Johns, would rotate to Berlin
and they would take the ground route. It was further announced
that Vice President Lyndon Johnson would fly to Berlin, meet with
West German leaders and personally greet the task force when it
entered the city.
The 14th Cavalry Goes
on Alert
In Army Magazine July, 2004, BG ( ret ) Albin F. Irzyk, Commander of
the 14th ACR in 1961 wrote at length of his recollections of both
the Spring and Summer 1961 and his actions as RCO. Extracted here
are a few segments from the article.
*****
With that news it appeared that the shoe had, indeed, dropped. I
spent only a moment speculating. My wartime Army commander, Gen.
George S Patton Jr. had preached, “ Do something now! “ Without
hesitation I ordered the elements of my regiment to move at once to
their operational positions. As out vehicles moved through the
streets of the German cities the inhabitants, as always were hanging
out of their windows. This time their faces showed puzzlement,
anxiety and even fear. Somehow intuitively, they recognized that
this was not a normal alert. That something important was afoot,
before we departed, out families were also alerted to be ready in
the event we were forced to implement the plan for the evacuation of
non combatants.
I reported to Corps Headquarters that my regiment had moved and was
in its forward positions. I quickly learned that along with
tension, there had also been some confusion. I was now informed
that Khrushchev had not made an overt threat to close the Helmstedt
- Berlin corridor and that thus far there had been no interference
with access. A moment later, however, I learned that I had made
the right call. I was provided with surprising and astonishing news
- the kind that is totally unexpected. President Kennedy had made a
critical decision, but one fraught with danger. He had decided that
he would send a US battle group, consisting of about 1500 American
soldiers, to Berlin along the Helmstedt - Berlin Autobahn.
*****
While the newspapers and magazines of the day gave extensive
coverage to both the building of the Berlin Wall and movement of the
Battle Group along the highway to Berlin, there was no coverage of
troop alerts in Germany or the actions of the 14th Cavalry. BG
Irzyk continued his recollection on the day the Battle Group reached
the border crossing at Helmstedt, located in the British sector of
border responsibility.
*****
Then came the news that brought goose pimples and butterflies in our
stomachs. The battle group would kick off at 06.00 hrs Sunday, 20
August for the110 mile test ride to Berlin.
On the border, in our deployed positions, tension that had been
increasing by the hour now reached an unbelievable pitch. It became
so tight and crisp that in virtually crackled. We were holding our
breaths.. It was not inconceivable that we might soon be in a
firefight, so were leaning well forward in our foxholes. We tried
to visualize the possibilities and probabilities: the convoy could
proceed to Berlin without any attempt to stop it, the convoy could
be stopped by a physical roadblock covered by military troops and
ordered to return to the west or it could be fired upon by Russian
forces perhaps including tanks. If either of thee two provocations
occurred what could be the actions of the US forces? What orders
had Col Johns received from the president? If he had been told that
his mission was to get to West Berlin and to shoot it out if
necessary, World War III could well be hanging in the balance. If
US forces nearby and at the ready, the Russians could escalate the
situation by moving to the west in strength.
*****
Col ( ret ) Ray Teel
I was the troop commander, Troop "F" 2nd Squadron 14th ACR. That
tour in Germany was Sept. 1959 - Nov. 1962. I started as the Asst.
S-3, then S-3, then CO H Troop (tank), followed by the F Troop tour
Aug. '60 -- Nov. '62. Earlier in my career, I had been with the 2nd
Armored Division in Germany so I felt very comfortable with the
terrain and missions.
At 4:00 AM on Sunday 13 August '61, we were called out on what
seemed at first a normal monthly alert. This changed dramatically,
as before movement permission, all Troop CO's were called to the
Squadron HQ where we were directed not to go to our normal alert
locations, but to other pre-selected positions. These positions were
quite secret. Some Troop CO's as I recall, had not ever seen them. I
was familiar with my position because in my time as S-3, we had
covertly selected them.
Today, I cannot recall exactly that location but it was closer to
the Border than our usual alert site and on a closed surfaced road,
where we could anticipate a strong force crossing. Having the
farthest to go on the right flank of the Squadron I moved first, at
about 05:00 hrs. I remember the Troop moved out in good order and
we even were towing some deadlined tanks (none mine). The only
person I remember left back was the Asst. S-3 who was the NEO
(Non-Combatant Evacuation Order) officer to implement that program
if ordered. Our Chaplain, Cpt Moorefield who also served as the
Post Chaplain accompanied the squadron into the field
Across the parade field, the 28th FA Battalion did not deploy and in
one of those odd details recalled over so many years, I remember
that the Sunday Chapel Services did continue with my wife, who was
the choir director and the FA Bn XO cobbling together the services.
The Troop on normal border rotation, as I recall moved out in front,
to the north, of the Border Camp, and continued the border patrol
operations and communications.
We closed into our positions as covertly as possible about 10:00 AM.
I immediately put out 3 OP/LP teams, again covertly, with a coverage
of about 6 miles maintaining the Troop intact on a good blocking
position. By about 3 PM, I selected patrol routes on routes about
500 - 1000 km from the Border as covert as possible and kept one
mounted patrol out 24 hours. The mini radar, PPS-4 had been recently
introduced and we put it to use nights on the center OP/LP. On two
occasions there were reports of track movement. Whether these
reports were accurate or due to operator apprehension was never
determined. The Regimental commander, Col Irzyk, inspected the
position after 4 - 5 days and was pleased with our disposition
plan. As I recall we stayed at this alert site for about 3 weeks
and then the crisis was over and we moved the Troop to Camp Wollbach
for our normally scheduled cycle and began routine border patrol
duties.
All in all, I recall the feeling quoted by BG ( ret ) Irzyk. We
certainly felt that combat on the border as imminent and tried to
keep the troopers ready for that eventuality. About the 3rd day of
the alert, we saw new East German fence building and reinforcement
of the border barrier and they continued these improvements until
the opening of the Wall and uniting Germany in 1989.
*****
Col ( ret ) Kurt Rosler
Yes, I remember the alert that occurred during the 1961 Berlin
crisis. Along with all the other recon platoon leaders of the 2/14th
Cav, I moved my Plt to it's final GAO position on high ground
approximately 1.5 km from the actual border. As you know our mission
was to delay the advancing Soviet forces by moving to battle
position in our border area.
My platoon was deployed to delay along Hy 19 which we believed would
be a major route of enemy advance. We were combat loaded and I was
rather nervous, not about me but about my family in BK. We had a
little Simca with a case of C-rations in the trunk. Myrna and the
kids were supposed to follow an evacuation route from Bad Kissingen
to France. I just hoped they could make it; my own chances were
pretty much nil. I can't remember how long we were in the field on
that alert, some weeks I guess, but we finally backed off and
returned to BK.
Bill Copp was in H Company, and they were located to the rear of the
Squadron as a counter-attack force. As you know I went back to the
2/14 for a second tour later in my career and other than that one
alert in 1961, we never again deployed to those specific GAO
positions. It just so happens that I have my original border map in
front of me right now and my position was on hill 353 just south of
Eussenhausen off of Highway 19. As BG Irzyk said, it was a sober
event and those in command at Regt level must have been more
informed than we were and certainly more nervous.
*****
What Happened Next
Surprisingly, all parties walked away with something from this first
stage of the Berlin
Crisis. The Russians and East Germans were able to divide the city
formally and stop the flood of refugees. Much of the post war
cooperation necessary to run the city as part of a four ally
partnership simply faded away, Ulbrecht was able to posture as an
equal partner with the Soviets and construction of the border
barrier system picked up at a frantic pace.
For the Americans and West Germans, they had shown resolve, lost
very little and had exercised the behind the scenes negotiation
skills necessary to insure that Colonel Johns and his men would be
granted free access to Berlin. This ability to quickly act outside
of public side of diplomacy would pay great dividends only one year
later, when the world really did stand at the gates of nuclear war
during the Cuban missile crisis.
The complete article written by BG ( ret ) Irzyk recalling the days
immediately preceding and then the unfolding of the first phase of
the Berlin crisis of 1961 is here as a PDF doc.
Great thanks to Colonels Rosler and Teel for their recollections.
As of this date, BG Irzyk is in retirement in Florida.
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To view the full-sized picture, click on the thumbnail
Vice President Johnson greeting American troops in Berlin.
He made quite a splash in the city during the days prior to
the arrival of the Battle Group to include hosting a huge
affair for the West German dignitaries and diplomatic staffs
featuring southern fried chicken. |
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To view the full-sized picture, click on the thumbnail
The second phase of the Berlin Crisis began in October of
1961, iconic photos of the Cold War caught Russian and
American tanks lined up at Check Point Charlie seemingly
ready to start World War III. The incident began over East
German demands to check the papers of American diplomats as
they crossed into East Berlin, something only the Russians
had been allowed to do previously. Both sides worked the
phones and the tanks were backed out of the square one by
one. |
Here is the PDF doc
of BG Irzyks’s complete recollection of the events leading up to the
Berlin Crisis. This article appeared in Army Magazine in 2004 and
was republished in 2005 in a limited edition recollection of those
events. Please see:
The 14th Armored Cavalry Regiment During the Berlin Crisis
BG Albin F. Irzyk
Star Group Book Division
ISBN 1 – 884 – 886 – 52 - 3
August 2014 |
