Armor Board and the Laser Rangefinder

Doug Kibbey:

"As the 2/11^th ACR stood down and was withdrawn from RVN in early 1972, a couple of us had the privilege to be assigned to the United States Army Armor and Engineer Board (USAARENBD, the "Armor Board") at Ft. Knox where my first duty was to join the Laser Rangefinder Project, which was already in progress. This system was described by COL (Ret) Anker in the previous chapter, and I can confirm one of his more interesting observations, in particular the apparent ability to displace birds from a perch with the laser pulse. There was considerable training on this system, and we were monitored as regarded the safety implications … the unknown regarding this aspect is evidenced by the fact that those on the project had monthly ophthalmographic photos of the retina taken to determine if any scarring had occurred. On those days, we’d report to a base ophthalmologist and have our eyes dilated and subjected to a BRIGHT flash photograph of the retina that left one unsuitable for duty for the rest of the day, so we’d try to schedule these early for an easy day off."

"This was the first LRF system to be employed on a production American fighting vehicle … as an "add-on" component as was previously noted, and was essentially the same as the integral unit first incorporated from the beginning on the M60A2 ‘ Starship’, on which Initial Production Test project I also served."

"The LRF project for the Sheridan predictably involved a lot of live fire, normally conducted at McFarland & Oliver Tank Gunnery Range well down Porter River Rd. Additionally, the ability of the system to withstand operational miles was tested, and included ‘X’ numbers of road miles, unimproved (dirt) road miles, and cross-country miles between firing sessions. Cross-country miles were accumulated unobserved in the expanse of Carpenter Test Area, which was restricted access in the NW quadrant of Ft. Knox beyond Cullen Maintenance Facility and extending to the Ohio River, where we permitted ourselves a fair amount of fun in the driving (bringing back a dry tank commander was unofficially discouraged)."

"In the interim period prior to and during service as OPFOR (( opposing forces )) VISMOD vehicles, the M551 was still serving operationally with the 82^nd Airborne Div. and was deployed in the conflict in Panama and to Saudi in Desert Storm. Photos of the M551 on the streets of Panama with the usual complement of sandbags and other accessory gear was seriously reminiscent of Sheridans in Vietnam and I distinctly recall a sense of déjà vu at seeing those images in the press and on the news."

"We begin the final chapter and a lengthy period of honorable service for the M551 that witnessed a concurrent and then narrowed role as both operational combat vehicle to enemy surrogate vehicle for force-on-force simulated combat."

Initially pioneered by the US Navy and quickly adopted by the US Air Force in the early 1970s, the idea of developing specialized squadrons schooled extensively in Soviet air to air combat tactics was a huge step forward in the development of highly realistic training programs. The threat aircraft were configured whenever possible to both physically resemble Soviet aircraft and also mimic their performance characteristics. Each training engagement was fully tracked with radar, video tape and audio tapes of crew transmissions to allow a complete debriefing of the pilots on the ground at the conclusion of the training day. At the high point of the program, the Air Force had 4 dedicated aggressor squadrons with much of the training focused at Nellis AFB. The US Navy maintained two aggressor training squadrons, one in California and the second in Virginia. The training benefit was seen as equally important in both flying and fighting and then discussing mistakes made and lessons learned.

The US Army was very interested in adopting a similar program for maneuver training. As planners turned away from Vietnam and looked to where potential battlefields might exist beyond the plains of central Europe, clearly, a new focus on desert warfare crystallized. Twice, the world had held its breath, 1967 and 1973, as Israel and the combined armies of Arab neighbors clashed. Both times, the potential existed that the US might become directly involved in response to Soviet aid to Egypt and Syria. Money and technology began to come together as the National Training Center was established at Fort Irwin California; the Army embraced a high tech approach to both battlefield simulation and ability to both track and then replay the battle in what became knows as the "fight the battle - talk the battle" approach.

Key to the battalion level "force on force" training was the use of the MILES, multiple integrated laser engagement system, widely fielded during this period. The system, now in a second generation form, allows weapons from the M16 rifle through tank main gun to fire "bursts" of laser light that mimic the ballistic characteristics of the firing weapon to engage targets in free maneuver. Both vehicles and personnel are fitted with sensors to register a "hit". If engaged by an appropriate weapon, the "hit" vehicle or individual soldier is rendered incapable of further participation in the fight until "revived" by an umpire. The system was an enormous step forward for the Army and remains integral to maneuver training today.

The Air Force mock up of Soviet fighters greatly enhanced the training benefit for pilots, the Army needed a ready platform for a similar program to make training at the NTC as realistic as possible. Enter the Sheridan, just washed out of the active inventory with the exception of the micro fleet at Fort Bragg, a new mission for an old system. The Sheridans were fitted with a variety of hull modifications to make them resemble a vast array of Soviet weaponry, all were MILES equipped.

The National Training Center’s dedicated training support unit, the 177th Armor Brigade was deactivated on October 26, 1994 and then reactivated as the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment ( - ). The M551 VISMODs had been in active use since the center opened in 1980.

Doug Kibbey:

The following can be found as part of the Ft. Irwin/11^thCav/OPFOR online history:

"The 60th Guards Motorized Rifle Division (GMRD), world famous as the oldest existing opposing force in the Army on continuous active service, awaits its next victim.

The Opposing Force (OPFOR) was created to provide a realistic, competitive and uncooperative force capable of conducting free-play offensive and defensive operations against the Army's Heavy Brigade Combat Teams.

The National Training Center (NTC) was activated at Fort Irwin, California, on 16 October 1980. In June of 1981, the 6th Battalion, 31st Infantry was formally reactivated at Fort Irwin as a mechanized infantry battalion. This battalion was formed from the 2d Battalion, 58th Infantry which was deactivating. LTC Wissinger and a small cadre of his soldiers from Fort Hood oversaw the shipment of equipment and LTC Wissinger became the commander of the newly formed 6th battalion, 31st Infantry. Fort Irwin was subsequently returned to active status as an installation on 1 July 1981. These two units were activated as Forces Command separate battalions and wore the FORSCOM patch. In these early days there was no headquarters assigned to oversee the operations of these battalions. The National Training Center's Deputy Commander for Training had the "additional duty" of serving as the commander of the OPFOR. Colonel William H. Reidl was the OPFOR’s first commander. The last six months of 1981 were a very busy time for the new OPFOR regiment. Some of their more notable accomplishments included:

• Unloading, de-processing, and road marching over 200 rail loads of both battalions' equipment.
• Conducting M551 Sheridan Transition Training.
• Conducting Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES) training.
• Executing formal evaluation exercises (ARTEPs).
• Conducting Tank Gunnery for 1-73d Armor in October.
• Completing six weeks of OPFOR training administered by the Red Thrust Training Detachment.
• In November, both units received their US equipment at the NTC equipment pool for use by rotational units.

With all the required training complete by mid-December the battalions of the regiment formed up together for the first time in their OPFOR uniforms."

-Among the equipment mentioned in the online history were eventually 300-330 M551 Sheridans. Over the years, the M551 was used as an OPFOR vehicle visually modified to serve as various models of the Boyevaya Mashina Pyekhoty (BMP), the T-72, the 122mm SP Howitzer and the ZSU-23-4 SP anti-aircraft platform. 1992 saw the introduction of the upgraded Sheridan VISMODs altered to resemble the threat represented by the T-80, and the introduction of the OPFOR Surrogate Vehicle (OSVs) represented by the forerunner of the eventual replacement of the Sheridan, M113 variants fitted with Bradley turrets. A number of M551s were also stripped and painted to serve as umpire vehicles during field exercises and with the introduction of MILES gear, were equipped with what became known as the "god gun" which could be used to activate the "killed" indicators for vehicles deemed to have fallen victim to mines or other hazards. Over it’s lifetime as a VISMOD vehicle, various materials were used to modify the appearance, including plywood, sheet metal, fiberglass and plastic pipes for gun extensions. High fidelity to the vehicle being mimicked was not a priority, but at a distance the resemblance can be quite convincing.

As might be expected, the organization, focus, and equipment of the OPFOR at Ft. Irwin evolved steadily over the years, and an excellent review of these topics and the sequence of commanders is available online via Internet at the Ft. Irwin website. Of more immediate concern here is the service typical of units operating the M551 as a surrogate vehicle. With the introduction/evolution of more sophisticated simulator equipment (MILES I & II), there was a gradual loss of expertise in tank gunnery using this platform and indeed, most of the more recent Sheridan crews have never fired the 152mm gun/launcher. Many of the Sheridans operating at Ft. Irwin did not have breech assembly’s installed as they were not needed. In fact, the lack of commonality with any other vehicle and the uniqueness of the skills required to crew the Sheridan-based VISMODs became one of the reasons for the conversion the OSV units, in addition to the escalating maintenance problems and associated costs. Special training to operate the Sheridans did not carry over usefully to other vehicles and help maintain crew readiness for real-world conflicts.

As the Sheridan became more dated, maintenance problems became predictably more acute, and a credible threat to more advanced equipment like the M1 Abrams family led to the adoption of even some M1s as an advanced, unspecified, potential enemy platform better represented by that vehicle. Dubbed "Krasnovian Variant Tanks" (KVT’s) for the mythical country that operates them, they provide some of the operational ability lacking in the M551 VISMOD (speed, reliable stabilization, etc.)

A recent and regular participant of the OPFOR with 1/221 Cav "Wildhorse" consulted for the preparation of this feature shared the following insights of operations during 2003:

"It is important to think about how the Krasnovian MIC (Mechanized Infantry Company) is organized to understand how their "T80s" were used."

"A fully operational MIC has something like 3 M551s (T80s) and 9 BMPs (M113s). The MIC almost always operates with a CRP (Combat Reconnaissance Patrol) of 2 BMPs as a screen for the main body, followed by the tank platoon and then the APCs."

"Most MRC commanders would much rather lose two BMPs in the CRP than their entire lead platoon when making contact with BLUFOR. OPFOR is always seriously outranged, and outgunned by BLUFOR, and they need the extra time to react and maneuver. The job of the CRP is essentially to make contact, get killed and radio the BLUFOR's grid location with their dying breath. The "T80s" are used to kill BLUFOR tanks first, and then focus on the APCs, followed by dismounts."

"Furthermore, the MIC cannot shoot on the move like BLUFOR can, so more often than not when making contact, the entire MIC will stop online and "volley" their fire with the M551s always focusing on killing the M1s before they can be brought into the fight."

"The MILES II system allows a great deal of realism when in a "laser fight". Not only do the hull and turrets have separate armor values, but each side has different values as well. The M551 VISMOD does not have a laser range finder (and they would not be allowed for use at the NTC if it did), so it is very important to get a solid bore-sight with the MILES laser prior to any battle. With a solid bore-sight you can hit anything between 1200 and 1800 meters center mass. Most engagements are at less than 2000 meters."

"Every M551 I have seen has always had a crew of 3 or less (usually an E5 and two troopers). Since no loader is required with MILES, more vehicles can be crewed with fewer men. I have at times seen them crewed by only two. Me, I don't how they manage to fight effectively with only a TC and a driver but they seem to do all right."

"Probably the reason the M551 was replaced was because its engine and transmission were so prone to breaking and we had exhausted all of our replacement parts, and rebuilding them consumed too much time."

That last comment is exactly right and this observation was confirmed by officers and men at every level during a visit in October, 2003.

The September, 1998 issue of Soldiers-Online carried a feature on the mechanics of the NTC and the OPFOR in particular and produced the following figures to illuminate the requirements being made upon that specialty, and not incidentally the load that continued use of the M551 Sheridan was imposing:

• Average rotation: 10 days
• Annual rotations: 10
• Enlisted mechanics: 250
• Weapon systems: 2,000
• Radios: 1,200
• Generators, wheeled vehicles, etc: 2,800
• M551 Sheridan tanks: 180
• Sheridan wear and tear: 263 miles per rotation
• Engines replaced: 25-30 per rotation
• Replacement time: 8 hours per engine
• New Sheridan engine: $18,000
• Rebuilt Sheridan engine: $2,000 to $4,000
• New engine for M1 tank: $500,000

-Note that from the original figures of between 300-330 M551s originally delivered, the numbers being operated were down to nearly half that by 1998. As OSVs were introduced into the inventory, Sheridans were being individually retired. In another feature from Soldiers-Online in November 1999, it was reported that the cost of operation of an M551 had become double that of an OSV. During my visit to the NTC in 2003, it was reliably reported verbally that more recently the cost differential had risen to become more like three times that of an OSV. Clearly the cost was becoming increasingly burdensome and the crews operating them were not practicing the vehicle operation skills integral to their primary training.

"Something is always broken," reported one mechanic in an article "The Unsung Heroes of NTC" who has been working on OPFOR tanks for almost two years. "You have to understand that any time these old vehicles stop, you have to start working on them or they will break down."  In most cases the OPFOR's 180 Sheridan tanks are older than the men who drive them.  "Let me put it this way," West explained. "I looked at the serial number on a tank I was driving here. It was 000004 -- fourth one off the assembly line. I bet the only Sheridan older than that is at the museum."