The Gary Bell Photo Album		As the new Sheridans were handed off, the crews found them enclosed in a tarp and bow configuration with the associated equipment in a large wooden crate bolted to a deck extension. Here, from the 1966 Sheridan -12 TM, the diagram for the depot bow kit.

A long delayed and very expensive program, the M551 had many critics and with a less than spectacular initial experience in Vietnam, the House Armed Services Sub Committee held hearings in the Spring and Summer of 1969 to examine the entire tank program. A report by the General Accounting Office investigating the Sheridan program noted, "... not one Sheridan as originally designed and produced was suitable for combat use without extensive retrofits ..."and that hundreds of unissued tanks in depots that had passed the final military-civilian joint inspection, were defective and not ready for deployment.".

This was not the first time that a Congressional sub committee had called the Army to account for a tank program. In the Summer of 1960, the General Accounting Office had drafted a report challenging the readiness of the armor fleet and the M48 in particular. The report noted a major malfunction rate of one event per thirty-seven operational miles at the three Army installations studied. The Secretary of the Army, Wilber Brucker, countered that the GAO did not understand the readiness reporting program and that a tank "dead-lined" at 0700 hours for low oil, was combat ready at 0705 once the crew addressed the issue. They argued back and forth for six months; Congress accused the Army of inaccurate and less than honest answers and noted that the entire maintenance records of one division appeared to have been "thrown away and then rewritten ...". By November, the investigation had run its course. The sub committee believed the tank fleet was not combat ready and Secretary Brucker flatly rejected the findings. Nine years later, the politicians, accountants and generals resumed the battle.

In testimony, a running figure of 1.3 billion dollars from design to manufacture to limited fielding was quoted for the Sheridan program, in budgets of the day, a very substantial figure for an Army program. Samuel S. Stratton (Dem. upstate New York) summed up the feeling of the committee, he noted the entire program was a display of "bumbling ineptness". Much of the early testimony focused on the M81 cannon and the ammunition problems. This cannon was the central feature for much of the US armored force new generation, M551, M60 A2 and MBT 70, and it was still a very troubled component.

Major General Roland B. Anderson, Director of Material Acquisition, detailed how the production of the Sheridan was continued in the mid 1960s despite the main gun problems; the feeling was that the problems related to the missile and cannon would eventually be solved and that the Sheridan program could not be allowed to go dormant, too much money had already been spent. He also testified that 300 completed M60A2s and an additional 243 M60A2 turrets were in storage waiting for resolution of the gun and fire control issues. This program would continue once the "fixes" occurred. It might appear as though every safeguard in the life of a major equipment development program had been ignored; but he testified the "closed breech scavenging system" currently being retro fitted into the fleet solved many but not all of the M81 problems. Army officials also testified that the "urgent need" of the Sheridan for Vietnam service required a "fast track" outside of normal review. The sub committee noted that they felt the Army witnesses displayed a "total lack of candor".

Same manual, the deck extension. After in processing the vehicle, the bow and extension kits were discarded. --David C. Clarke		A Sheridan road march, probably after a POMCUS draw from the mid 1970s. The image shows what new Sheridans would have looked like as the crews first took them out for road trials. --US Army / Mesko

The hearings continued through mid Summer; problems and cost over runs of the MBT 70 program were examined, the failure of the first turret stabilization system for the M60 fleet was examined. The focus turned back to the M551 and Col Merritte W. Ireland, 11th ACR Executive Officer in Vietnam, was called as the expert witness for Sheridan experiences in combat. He noted, "It is a fine vehicle for Vietnam".

The hearing closed, and although not written into the final record there were three conclusions in the halls of Congress: the M60A2 program needed specific attention and probably should be killed, the MBT 70 program should be reviewed and almost certainly would be killed and that Chrysler, manufacturer of the M60 series, would have the inside track for future tank development. The much troubled M551, with the production goals nearly met, would be fielded if for no other reason than some improvements with the cannon had occurred and the major costs of the program in development and manufacturing had already been paid. The fielding program for the M551 began for 7th Army in Germany in the late 1969 with at least two divisional cavalry squadrons first up. It appears as though the 2/14 ACR, attached to the 2 ACR, was the first USAREUR regimental cavalry unit to draw the new vehicles.

M551 fielding to the 2/14 ACR

Col (Ret) Norm Harms

"I was the SCO of the 2/14 ACR during this period and I do not have a strong memory of the initial fielding of the M551 to the unit; we went through a lot of equipment changes in 1969-70, fresh M114A1s, exchange of the cav troop M60s for M60A1s and then, the Sheridan draw, much of it blends together. We were attached to the 2 ACR at the time and we were the first squadron in the regiment to receive them. We very well may have been one of the first unit in USAREUR to receive them. During the issue of the Sheridans, I was not impressed by the personnel, civilian and military conducting the hand off and training. It seemed far from an "A" team. I do recall the first major gunnery at GTA late that Fall because I changed command immediately afterwards and returned to Vietnam."

"I was not a fan of the M551 and felt the fielding had been a rushed operation. Once we had the vehicles, all the problems came to light, the turret and fire control had a host of electronic issues and our turret mechanics had received only an OJT exposure to a very complex machine during the hand off. Fort Knox was very slow in catching up with the fielding plan in terms of sending school trained personnel in any of the key MOSs. Maybe everyone was going to Vietnam but that problem should have been identified earlier."

Mid 1970s image of a cavalry Sheridan on the border, oddly with rail loading equipment attached to the front. The rubber muzzle plug is clearly evident. --US Army / Mesko		-12 image of the gunner's position in the turret. By M1 tank standards, not too complicated but for newly trained troopers in 1970 coming from the M60A1 tank, it was a daunting array of panels, switches, adjustments and meters. Much of the interior of the turret was covered with " little white boxes " connected by cables, all part of the fire control system and all subject to failure. --David C. Clarke

"When we went to GTA for Level 1 gunnery, I left three Sheridans at Daley, they simply could not be made ready to fire. Once at Graf, other maintenance problems began to reduce our fleet of Sheridans and I was amazed that there were no floats available when maintenance problems occurred that could not be solved quickly. This led to rotating crews through the tanks that did function properly. I think we qualified about ½ of the crews; considering what I felt was a poor new equipment fielding plan, lack of school support and lack of adequate support at the MTA, I was not disappointed in this result. Upon return to BK, we had the change of command and LTC Tuggle took over. I figured things would improve with time but I wished him much luck with the Sheridans."

Terry R. Smith

"I was a SP/5 in Troop G during the fielding and I certainly recall those days. Anytime you get something brand new and unusual, it sticks to your memory plus, I was selected with another trooper to help out with driver's training of the Sheridan when it was issued in Fulda and Bad Hersfeld. Here is how I recall those days."

Part 1

"In July of 1970 I came back to G Troop after 30 days leave in the states. The 2nd Platoon was up on the border at Camp Coburg so I was transported from BK up to Coburg. After finishing our tour on the border the unit came back to BK. From BK we were transported by rail to Vilseck near Graf to receive the new M551 Sheridans. At the time all we knew was that were going to pick up some new vehicles for the unit, we had no idea that we were going to be getting new "tanks" and give up our M60s and M60A1s. You can imagine our surprise when we were led up the hill past the mess hall at that time and down the road to a medium size hard stand and shop type building and rows of what appeared to be brand new vehicles of some type covered with tarps and with wood crates on the back deck. We were told to go pick a vehicle and once we did it was ours. The vehicles were lined up in such a manner that each troop had a row of them before we were turned loose we were told that they were M551 Sheridans. Well all I knew about the Sheridan was that some of my buddies in AIT at Knox had been sent to Sheridan School after AIT. Back then, assignment to Sheridan school meant a trip to Vietnam."

"So some of us were quite concerned as to what the hell was going on and why everything up to this point everything had been so hush-hush. We all knew that in the last seven or eight months we had received new M114 A1E2 (Not sure on the exact model) that were equipped with Hispano-Suiza 20 mm cannons which had been a hell of an upgrade from the .50 Cals the old ones had. We had received new M113A1s and new M107A1 4.2 inch mortar carriers. So a rumor started running through the Squadron that said we were going to Vietnam which made some sense to us since we had all new tracked vehicles in the recon troops and H Company got the pick of the best M60A1s to keep and we turned in all the junk."

"It was August of 1970 and we were at Vielseck. The weather was beautiful. We were in the cinder block barracks with our own mess hall not too far from the issue and training point. All together, there were probably less than 150 guys from the squadron involved in this affair. The actual draw of Sheridans was a straight swap of the recon troop M60s for the M551s; three per platoon, nine per troop and so on. We still had the M114s, five per platoon, and Sheridans at this ratio until I left BK in 1971, what an organization ... Sheridans and M114s! It must have looked great in Washington but in Germany, it was all problems all the time. All soldiers complain, I know that, but with that set of combat vehicles, believe me, we had a lot to complain about. But when we were getting the new tanks at Graf, we were like kids on Christmas morning. It was all new and exciting."

An image of just the components associated with the missile system. --David C. Clarke		Interior view of the TC's position in the turret with a detail of the power control to the cupola. --David C. Clarke

"But getting back to the story, once they turned us loose it was like letting a bunch of kids loose in a candy shop, we used no logic what so ever on which M551 we picked out as a crew. It was just first come first served. Because I was on the Tank Section Sergeant's crew we picked one out and promptly christened it G26. We had to be restrained from going nuts and ripping open and scattering all to hell the gear in the wood crates secured to the back deck. We started opening them up and they were full of new weapons and gear for the new M551s. I mean new M2 .50 cals no more M85s which we thoroughly hated because it was pain to load the TC ammo box and it only held 75 rounds and with high and low firing speed it only took an fraction of a second in high mode to burn up 75 rounds. There was a new coax, the M73A1, and new barrels and new this and new that ... you had to be there to see our excitement but it was excitement tempered with the nagging question, ' Why are we getting all this new gear? ' ."

"The senior NCOs and officers stopped us from spreading new gear from asshole to appetite saying slow down and don't take it out of the boxes we have to inventory everything to ensure the old man, Lt. Hurd was getting what he was about to sign for. So that's kind of how the first day ended with us just wandering around in fine mill around mill fashion still kind of star struck as to just what the hell was going on. PS: it had the biggest god damn main gun we had ever seen 152 mm and it fired some kind of missile they called a Shillelagh missile, which I knew stood for a big club in Irish. Plus I got a hold of a really neat little book out of one of the boxes with the title of M551 Sheridan Weapon System Handbook. And, the turret inside looked like something out of 2001 and Space Odyssey or the Apollo moon program with switches and colored lenses (which we later learned to cuss about) and a couple of big gray bottles and some damn thing under the loaders seat which was to damn small."

Part 2

"The days after being introduced to our new steeds were filled with inventorying issued equipment, cleaning cosmoline off of new crew served weapons, packing issue equipment away and a hundred other things related to receiving new tracked vehicles. We studied TMs and the M551 handbook and became familiar with the engine, transmission, main gun hydraulic system, closed breech scavenger system, electric turret operation and controls, main gun primary and only day light sight, the near IR, or Pink light as we called it, sights and the Missile Control System and aligning the missile sight reticle and missile tracker, removing track pads to shorten the track and a hundred other tasks."

"Eventually the time came to start to putting them through their paces so we could see what they would do. So we began to take the whole Squadron out and road march the Sheridans. Because we were short personnel I got to be both Driver and Loader. Compared to the acceleration of a 60 ton M60 series tanks these things could fly or so it seemed to us, hell no APC would leave us in the dust any more, but a couple of things we noticed were that the engine had a hell of a whine from the turbo and it became evident that you could see that exhaust rooster tail for a ways."

"The second road march we took was to a range were the main gun was to be proof fired. When we arrived at the range the vehicles were guided to a spot on the firing line and the crew was told to go get a main gun round and load it in the breech, leave the safety on and then get out but leave the master switch on. On my way out of the driver's compartment I thought for a second and remembered to pull the main gun's barrel plug out. The other guys in the crew loaded the main gun round that had been given to us. We all went about 50 meters to the rear of the vehicle and stood around watching the show, smoking cigarettes and acting cool."

"As we stood there we watched two guys, a couple of civilians, go around to each Sheridan one at a time and climb on board and disappear down the loaders hatch. After a few minutes they climbed back out and were trailing a long electrical cable and what appeared to be some type of thumb switch. After they were clear of the vehicle and about half way back to were we were standing they stopped and the Range tower announced the unusual is there anybody down range, after three or four of these announcements, one of the guys pushed the switch and the main gun went off, and that is proof firing. I guess they were proving to us that the damn thing wouldn't blow up on us when it was fired, or at least making sure that no one was hurt if there was any sort of problem with the very first round."

"One thing we immediately noticed was the vehicle clearing the ground with the first three road wheels, the tremendous movement of the vehicle and that damn big cloud of crap out of the main gun that from where we were standing, seemed to obscure the TC's vision. We all commented immediately how it appeared that if you tried to sense the round with a pair of binoculars from the TC position you'd probably get them slammed through your skull and it would come out the back of your head. It was immediately apparent to us that we'd have to figure out a way for the TC to sense rounds without having the binos blackening at a minimum both his eyeballs."

The M2 machinegun fitted to the cupola with power traverse controls. The left and right power traverse controls can be seen immediately adjacent to the grips of the M2. The control wiring runs from the bottom of the machinegun forward towards the cradle. --David C. Clarke		Diagram showing the missile alignment tracker kit necessary to insure the sight and missile control optics were properly aligned ... move the vehicle .... do the test .... move the vehicle ... do the test. --David C. Clarke

"While we were bull shiting about this new problem we had seen, one of the guys from 1st Platoon came up and asked me what I had in my hand? Well I looked at him like he had just came from the planet Uranus and said it's the main gun barrel plug, what the fuck do you think it is, a rubber? Well, his eyeballs got as big as silver dollars and he blurted out that he forgot to pull his out. Welllllllllllllll! At about that time the main gun on his Sheridan went off and there went his fuck'n barrel plug up and down range. It turned out that only about a third of the crews in the Squadron had remembered to pull their barrel plugs soooooo there were about or fifteen plus barrel plugs that went down range never to be seen again."

"Most of the crews by that point were aware of their mistake before their main gun was fired. But, because the main guns were loaded they couldn't approach their vehicle to pull the barrel plug and the civilians said tough luck and kept on hooking up to the firing circuits and firing the main guns. So the crews in the G Troop, 2nd Platoon Tank Section who had pulled their barrel plugs spent the next hour or so watching the facial expressions of the other crews as their main guns were fired. You could tell which ones hadn't pulled the barrel plug out because their TCs were standing with their crews rolling their eyeballs and chewing their gunners out. So ended the proof firing phase and began the steal yourself a new barrel plug phase."

Part 3

"After the Main Gun Muzzle Plug up and down range fiasco, it was every crew for themselves when it came to muzzle plugs, our section took ours and painted them with our vehicle numbers on the inside. If anyone stole it, all we had to do was go around pulling them until we found the one that belonged to our vehicle. I mean this was a crisis! Without a muzzle plug all the cleaning done to the main gun was for naught because once you went on a gravel road or road march the inside of your main gun bore was full of dust and crap and that didn't bode well for troops who did not like to clean their main guns anymore than we needed to. In reading through the TMs it was listed that we were suppose to clean the main gun with some type of special bore cleaning solvent and use a bunch of other types of cleaners and oils. Well because it was the U.S. Army we are talking about, we had none of this stuff and never did, even up to the time I PCS'd back to the states in June of 1971. Doing what all good cavalry troopers do, we improvised, we mixed up a little diesel fuel some one gallon cans of rifle bore cleaner some L.A.W, M16 rifle lubricant at the time and proceeded to clean out our main guns for three days after firing. After the third cleaning we stuck the bore plug in and forgot all about the main gun."

"In the mean time some of the sharper troopers from the crews that sent their barrel plugs down range discovered that if you took the rubber bag that covered the combustible cartridge case for the conventional main gun rounds, you could use it as a main gun barrel prophylactic. It looked like hell but I guess it worked. After all this and a few more road marches we headed to the rail head and loaded our new ' tanks ' up for the trip back to BK. This was a overnight rail movement and we got honest to God sleeper cars, we thought we'd died and gone to heaven that night. The next morning we arrived at BK unloaded and road marched up to the Kaserne. When we got to the squadron hard stand we were surprised to see that a portion of it was cordoned off with concertina wire and we were directed to park there after we had washed our vehicles. This was our introduction to the ' Confidential ' security clearance requirement of the M551 Sheridan at that time."

"Shortly after our return to BK, we took a couple of our Sheridans out to a training location outside of BK to the local training area and began a month's worth of training in preparation for Tank Crew Qualification Course, TCQC, at Graf. This is the big deal for tankers, annual gunnery qualification. We spent the better part of September training day and night for Graf and TCQC. We were so short handed at that time in the squadron, training for TCQC became an all hands on deck training exercise. We were taking infantrymen (11B), scouts (11D), and mortar men (11C) and spent a month turning them into "tankers" (11E) for our M551 Sheridans. At this time I was the loader for our Sheridan bumper number G26. Also about this time we received permission from whom I don't know for sure, to put contact stickers on all the vehicles including the wheels, of Walt Disney's ' Goofy ' cartoon character."

A missile launch. --Hunnicut		This image is from Fort Knox but it shows how an early production model M551 as found in the 2/14 ACR in 1970 would have appeared. This Sheridan has the bore evacuator sleeve on the barrel, indicating it is a pre # 700 model, the missile tracker optics set is in the box immediately over the gun barrel at the mantel (the door is closed in the image), the set of shields surrounding the TC's position is evident and gives the turret the cluttered appearance that many Sheridan crews recall. --Stefanowicz

"When I arrived in December 1969, unofficially we were called itself Goofy Troop rather than Golf Troop We apparently had a less than desirable reputation in the Squadron ... if it can be screwed up, Golf troop would do it. But believe it or not, this symbol of the screw up actually raised the moral in the troop through the roof and turned our attitudes around 180 degrees. It became a matter of pride to us that Goofy Troop be the best damn cavalry troop in the Squadron if not the whole U.S. Army and as I remember, we came pretty close! So ... I was now the loader for Goofy 26."

"As we began TCQC training, a number of the less than desirable traits of the Sheridan and its electronics began to show up. Back in those days one part of the starting SOP for vehicles was, if they were equipped with a radio, it was suppose to be turned off before cranking the engine. This was something that almost reached the status of a religious icon and if you fried a radio because you failed to turn the radio off while starting up, which was about the only way you could fry one unless you hit a non insulated power line, you were looked upon as some type of fuck'n moronic low life, and then you'd get charged for the radio ... so it didn't happen all that often."

"So ... our crews got in the habit of leaving the turret traverse control electronics powered up and turning the radios off while cranking engines. We also got in the habit of running our turrets in the new high speed-low drag turret stabilization mode which kept the main gun always what we were pointing at while driving down the road, which was way cool."

"Wellllllllllll! Ugly things began to happen to our new steeds and we didn't know what caused the problems. All of a sudden for no good reason anybody could figure out, while going down our own little blank fire range course, as the TC starting giving out firing orders and slewing the turret to the target he wanted to engage with the main gun, the God damn main gun would go to full elevation and the fuck'n turret would start traversing to the left even though the TC wanted to go to the right ... and it would do all this at a great rate of speed, in fact ... as fast as the main gun would raise and the turret would traverse. So, basically it was out of control at high speed! Can you imagine the amount of cussing and swearing that was going on in those TC positions while all this was happening?! Not counting all the poor gunners whose head were sore from being kicked by the TC who was sure that the gunner somehow had his hands on the controls and had screwed things up."

"In the end, no matter what the TC did with his turret control he couldn't stop this from happening and in fact the only way to regain control was for the poor-sore headed gunner, who had already been kicked silly, to reach up and shut the turret traverse power completely off. But don't turn it back on because it didn't cure itself ... it just went back to doing what it did before you shut the turret traverse power off. So you are going down the road with no turret power and you ' re trying to practice crew battle drill. Whether it was haunted or untrustworthy or put together wrong we did not know. We did know it was very dangerous."

"So everyone was perplexed and the turret mechanic was called for and he hooked his little test rig up and after flicking a couple of switches, he announced that the problem was this little box under the radio which controlled turret stabilization was bad. He jerked it out and put a new one in and presto! The problem was fixed or so he thought. What no one knew at the time was that there were a very limited number of those little white boxes in Europe and none in the supply pipeline coming from the states. It seems no one considered that we might need a few spare parts for vehicles that were brand new."

"Our Sheridan, Goofy 26 also suffered this fate and a new box was put in it, but it turned out that this was the last little new white box in the Squadron and in Europe and no more were available. Well yours truly being the bright cavalry troop he was, got the M551 Sheridan Weapon System handbook out and discovered that on page three, second sentence, it said that all communications and accessory equipment should be turned off before starting the engine. Who'd of thought that the turret traverse control electronics would be considered accessory equipment by the United States Army, God damn?! So ... because of this small oversight the better part of our cavalry troop's direct fire, fire power was partially screwed up because of a less than clear TM and no one could recall anyone ever saying anything about this in the training when we were issued the tanks. Plus we weren't the only troop encountering these problems, so at this stage of our introduction to the M551 Sheridan the great cannibalization program started."

"While all this was going on, we decided to open the breech on the main gun and practice loading main gun rounds and missiles while going down the practice TCQC course. Imagine the surprise we got when we opened the breech and looked in about two weeks after the last cleaning we had given the main gun ... I would like to interject at this point that I believe there was a special reason that the Army listed a special bore cleaner and oils for the main gun of the M551 Sheridan. The main gun bore looked like a cross between oxidized copper that was sitting in salt water and something that has been in the back of the refrigerator to long. Needless to say we about shit, what a fuck'n mess, you would have never believed that we had cleaned that main gun for three days after the last time it was fired. We spent half a day cleaning out that mess, we learned something new ... never, never, never leave the breech closed for an extended time with the muzzle plug in the barrel. There must be something in the main gun rounds propellant that reacted with what we had made up for a cleaner. This became a never ending problem with the Sheridan main gun, no matter what we did about a week after we cleaned it last it looked as if we had never cleaned it at all. Just another new thing about the Sheridan for a trooper not to like."

Part 4

"We ran our practice blank fire TCQC (tank crew qualification course) day and night (in the local training area) no matter if it rained or was hot, the task was to get the non 11E MOS personnel up to speed and create viable tank crews for Graf. As Graf was the closest to a combat atmosphere other than Berlin or the border that the Army could offer in Europe, at the time we ran this little course as close to the Graf atmosphere as possible. Little sleep for the crews long hours and timed runs with observers (scorers) on each Sheridan. It kept us busy but the troops loved it and got with the spirit of the training and worked hard to become tankers if they weren't already (talk about beautiful personnel cross training)."

"They wanted every NCO to be a capable Sheridan T.C. particularly the E-7 platoon sergeants. With the Sheridans, the Platoon Sergeant now had a tank even if he had spent most of his career as a scout. This led to much excitement. We had been through several platoon sergeants that summer and the latest one was really having trouble. At about this time, the platoon lost the use of Goofy 25 due a fried stabilization control box, so it was not available for the PSG to use. The loss of this vehicle led to some crews doubling up. It was felt that the training of the gunner and T.C was more critical at this juncture so we did not double up all positions and it should be noted that at this time we could only come up with enough personnel in the troop to man the drivers and T.C. positions for the troop vehicles if we had been called out on alert. Even months after Graf and TCQC we were still very short of personnel."

"Well at the time I was still the loader on Goofy 26 so I was working with everyone that used our Sheridan for TCQC training and that included Lt. Hurd the Troop Commander. One of the loaders jobs when he is not loading main gun rounds while going through TCQC was to observe to the rear for any activity friendly or hostile and keep the T.C. appraised of it and to act as rear air guard for the vehicle. In addition, when the T.C. 's fire command was "CREW CALIBER 50", I was to make a 180 degree turn and face forward and spot the impact of the .50 caliber rounds giving adjust fire corrections to the T.C. This consisted of basically saying "OVER" or "SHORT" depending on the strike of the bullets."

"Because we were running long hours and trying to get everybody up to speed I was a pretty busy loader and because I was doing a good job, my T.C had recommended that I be given the drivers position for Goofy 26. This was quite a kick in the pants because everyone knows the T.C. may command the vehicle but it really belongs to the driver who is responsible for all maintenance automotive and gunnery, storage and ensuring that the vehicle is always ready for combat operations with full fuel tanks, all necessary lubricants on hand, and all the paperwork involving the maintenance of the vehicle and ammunition."

"But, before I became the driver, I was still the loader and doing the loaders job. One day the PSG was instructed to go through the TCQC training as a T.C. ... this made me nervous because the man had spent absolutely no time becoming familiar with the Sheridan and everything that went with the position. Based on the daytime training we had with him it seemed that my misgivings were unfounded (little did I know how wrong I was on this) but I still could not shake a feeling that something was going to happen with this guy in the T.C. position. After daytime training we were trucked back to Daley Barracks for chow except for a couple of guys who pulled guard on the Sheridans while were gone. After chow and a little free time, we were called back to formation and fell out for the truck to go back to the LTA for night TCQC training. This involved white light searchlight target illumination and Near I.R. (Pink Light) target illumination. This was back in the good old days before thermal sights and Gen III night observation sights and devices."

"We mounted up on Goofy 26 and moved into position to await our turn going for the night phase of our TCQC training course. During the night course, my position duties were the same as they were in daylight, eventually our turn came and we commenced movement down the course. After going through four or five different firing station scenarios, the next station was for the .50 Cal machine-gun engagement. At the appropriate place, the PSG who is in the T.C.'s position gave the fire command "DRIVER STOP!", "CREW CALIBER 50!". Upon hearing this fire command, I begin to turn clockwise in the loader hatch to face the front when all of a sudden I was hit by something that felt like a baseball bat propelled by a locomotive. I was shoved to the right and down and suddenly my head was trapped between the hatch opening and the turret top and was being kept there by God knows what!! My immediate thought was that I had just been decapitated by something. Well after I recovered, I began to cuss and swear and scream for somebody to get me out of this position ... and while I was raising hell I could hear the observer hollering at somebody not to touch a f----ing thing and to get the F------- out of the way. I could hear people scrambling around in the T.C. position and a few minutes later the cupola swung out the way to the rear and I could get my head clear of where I had been trapped. Like I said, it felt like I had been hit by a ball bat propelled by a locomotive. My neck and head hurt like hell, well needless to say our trip through the course was cut short after this incident. On the trip back to the course start point the controller asked the PSG on the intercom what he had done when he went to fire the 50 cal.?"

"Well the PSG said that he put both hands on the machine gun handles like he was going to press the butterfly trigger to fire the gun and squeezed the handles. Weeeeeeeeeell at this point yours truly exploded into the PSG and said if you'd have attended some of the training you would of found out that the one thing you don't do with the 50 cal. handles is grab the handles AND the power controls ... I sure as hell wasn't polite. When we got back to the starting point the CO heard the whole story. The next day in G Troop the word went out to not hook up the cupola electrical swing control umbilical cord to the cupola connection and it became SOP from then on. Any traversing to place the 50 cal. on target was to be done using the TIC. Turret control, all 50 cals were to always be pointed to the front. Fine adjustments to get on target were to be done using the pintle mount which had a limit swing area. If my memory is correct the electric cupola control switches mounted on the 50 cal hand grips were eventually removed through out the Troop and stored away if ever needed again."

"Our TCQC training continued with no let up, despite my near death experience, but it was the talk of the Troop for a couple of days. In the end, this particular PSG was pulled off the Sheridans a week or so later, did not participate in the further training and did not go through TCQC at Graf as a tank commander."

Part 5

Col (Ret) Harms may not recall the missile shoot but I do and I'll never forget firing them. There was a range just before we went to range 80 were crews could double check their main gun zero and fire one practice missile. We were sitting on the other side of the road from the range having DS personnel running a more detailed diagnostic check on our turret controls and motors and the missile subsystems. While they were doing this I and a couple of other guys from other crews were sitting on the turret of G26 kicked back and relaxing watching other crews fire missiles waiting for our turn."

"From our angle it looked like the stationary target they were firing at was up hill from the range line; they would fire a missile and get a hit. But every once and a while you would see a Sheridan fire it's missile and as the missile got closer to the target suddenly the main gun barrel would start to elevate to an extreme angle and eventually the missile would hit the ground well in front of the target. One of the guys exclaimed after this happened to the first Sheridan, "What the hell is wrong with those missiles!', I told him that I would bet him that the missiles were fine that the problem was that the gunner or driver had forgot to run a tracker alignment test to align the sight telescope missile reticle to the optical IR missile tracker and the reason the main gun was elevating was that they were trying to fly the missile into the target because the sight reticle was not aligned with the tracker. All this was laid out in the manuals but ... like I have said, it really helped to READ the manuals!"

"Well after this crew was done firing they came over with their vehicle and had the D.S. personnel check it out. I talked to one of the D.S. guys with whom we had been BS'ing with while checking out or Sheridan and he verified my diagnosis. He told me that the only thing wrong with the missile firing controls was what I thought was wrong from the get-go. After that we sat there and guessed which Sheridan crews had forgot to do the tracker alignment and just roared when their missile hit the dirt. You can bet when we got on the firing line that I reminded the gunner to perform that alignment task before we fired our missile, this was one of the quirks which made the Sheridan a hunk of junk."

"You have to understand just how much checking and monitoring and running diagnostic testing went in to see if you were ready to fight. I mean please Mr. Russian, the temperature went up 15 degrees we can't shoot a missile at you until we do the optical tracker alignment so would you please stand still until we do this and then we can blow you to hell. I mean you could put this thing out of alignment just driving the Sheridan down a sand road one vehicle length. I am damn glad we never went into a real shooting war with the damn piles of junk; why they took a way our real tanks away and gave us the paper weights is beyond me, but all I know is that a hell of a lot of good troopers would have been killed because they had to go into battle with this poor excuse of a ' tank '. We never would have slowed or stopped the Warsaw Pact with those damn things ... they would have gone through us like grass through a goose."

"And ... I am not sure the automotive part was much good either. Yes, it ran but there were problems with overheating and pulleys, belts, surge tanks, radiators and so on. Much of this was like the M113 but with that track, it was easy to check everything. You could get at the key points of the engine from the front, side and back of the power pack by just pulling the panels away. On the Sheridan, it was all done from the top, through the access doors and through the bottom of the hull, again, through little access doors."

"If it took the full time efforts of the TC, gunner and loader to see if the turret was ready, the poor driver was always running around checking stuff and if he didn't always have the lube order and the-10 Operator manual with him, he'd forget something and it would go wrong. In peace time, I guess you can afford that but in a war ... The M60 was very simple and straightforward in comparison. In the field, simplicity counts for a lot."

"We'd of wound up as little bloops of burned up aluminum with a burned up steel turret sitting on top of it or to put it more succinctly we would have looked like goose shit a pile of green shit with some funny colors mixed in it. I will never have any thing good to say about them. Even with experienced OJT trained crews, they were a bastard to keep up and be 100% mission capable. I mean the crews had to be better than good they had to be perfect! No room for error! And, those of us with experience know the odds of that happening in the U.S. Army are slim to none. It must have been a happy day in the ACR when they turned in the piles of crap and got real tanks!" again, even in the M60A3 with out Chobham armor or reactive armor you at least had a chance of survival with the Sheridan all you got was a grave marker."